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Make Room For the Students: Governance of
the Law School
John J. Regan*
HOULD STUDENTS SHARE THE POWER? The issue of student participation
in the governance of colleges and universities concerns virtually
every institution of higher education in the country. Confrontations at
some universities have focused on this issue as one of the prime causes of
student discontent. Other institutions have plunged quickly into investi-
gations and discussions of the question to head off such disturbances.
This issue may well outlive those substantive issues of of the '60's which
provoked it in the first place-the Vietnam War, the draft, military re-
cruitment, and the university-military complex.
The proposition that students should share in university governance
has recently received two impressive endorsements. The President's
Commission on Student Unrest recommended: "University governance
systems should be reformed to increase participation of students and
faculty in the formulation of university policies that affect them."' The
American Association of University Professors declared in its Draft
Statement on Student Participation in College and University Govern-
ment: "The statement.., is based on the premise that students as mem-
bers of the academic community . . . have a distinctive role which ...
qualifies them to share in the exercise of responsible authority on
campus." 2
Law schools have shared concern over this issue, although for the
most part their student constituencies tend to be less radical than their
undergraduate counterparts elsewhere in the university. Most law
schools have made adaptations in policy and structure to accommodate
the student movement and to make the faculty more aware of student
opinions.3 Professor Morris, of University of Washington, describes a
wide variety of such structures, ranging from institutions where students
are full voting members at law school faculty meetings to schools where
students are permitted only to voice complaints through a student bar
association.4 Just as the practice differs widely, so does the rationale or
* BA., Mary Immaculate College; M.A., St. John's University; J.D., Columbia Law
School; Ford Urban Law Fellow; member of the New York City Bar.
1 Report of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest, R-12 (Sept., 1970). Here-
after cited as Scranton Commission.
2 Draft Statement on Student Participation in College and University Government,
56 A.A.U.P. Bulletin 33 (1970).
3 The issue may well be to what extent, not whether, there should be student par-
ticipation. Bischoff, The Student and Law School Governance, 18 Clev-Mar. L. Rev.
234 (1969).
4 Morris, Student Participation in Law School Decision Making, 22 J. Legal Ed. 127,
137-8 (1970).
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the ideal guiding the practice. Dean Vernon X. Miller, a distinguished
legal educator, remarked, as recently as 1968, that student participation
should be discouraged because law schools are arms of the legal pro-
fessions, of which students are not yet members.5 Yet in 1969, Andrew
Dolan, a Columbia Law School student, told the Association of American
Law Schools Convention that "ten years from now we may have a
session on the faculty role in law school governance." 6
Some Preliminary Points
We shall deal with the question of student participation in law
school governance on its merits and at the level of principle, rather than
as a concession in the face of a student demonstration or confrontation.
We shall analyze its potential contribution to legal education instead of
treating it as the unwelcome result of any uneasy truce worked out to
buy peace for a harassed administration or faculty.
Student participation at law schools cannot be considered in isola-
tion from the role students do or should play in university governance.
Nearly all law schools today are affiliated with universities of varying
sizes and complexity. The parent university may already have come to
grips with the issue and have an established policy requiring some form
of student role in decision-making throughout the schools or departments
of the university. Indeed, many of those who propose some type of stu-
dent participation in university governance point out that the most
meaningful and successful student involvement occurs at the depart-
mental or professional school level.7 They believe that university or
college level bodies (e.g., a university senate) perform a necessary and
desirable function when they open their membership rolls to students.
Only a handful of students, however, can take part in such university-
wide governance, and communications between the student representa-
tives and their constituencies tend to be tenuous. Moreover, the masses
of non-participating students frequently do not sense that they are any
closer to having a real influence on university policy than they had be-
fore such representation was permitted. The decisions which most
directly affect students in their daily academic lives are those made at
the department level. The solution is participation at the lower levels
in the heirarchy of decision-making. Thus the law school faculty may
not be master of its own fate on this issue. It may find that university
5 1967-1968 Problems in Legal Education (Survey), 17 Clev-Mar. L. Rev. 189 (1968).
6 Proceedings, 1969 Annual Meeting A.A.L.S., at 79 (1969).
7 Neff, The Administrative Challenge of the New Student Activism, 39 J. of Higher
Ed. at 69 (1968); Johnstone, The Student and His Power, 40 J. of Higher Ed. at 205
(1969); Elliott, Changing Internal Structures: The Relevance of Democracy, as cited
in The Future Academic Community, at 44 (1969); Foote, Mayer and Associates, The
Culture of the University: Governance and Education, at 110 (1968).
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policy, or at least university welfare, may dictate that law students
assume an active role in the governance of the law school.
8
A further note of realism will be injected into this discussion if we
consider the type of student who will be entering the law school in the
'70's. In increasing numbers he will be a student who has become
accustomed to having a say or even a vote in the decisions that affect his
education. He will have experienced participation in his undergraduate
college and perhaps in his high school days. He will have learned that
his ideas may make a significant contribution to the policy-making
process of an institution, and he will have seen firsthand the terrible
fallability of faculty judgments and statements about policy. He will
therefore expect a larger role in law school governance.
Why Do Students Want Power?
The drive toward student power has its roots in campus unrest. This
unrest is not a single or uniform thing, according to the President's
Commission on Campus Unrest, but the sum of thousands of individual
value choices which students as individuals make.9 These choices or
commitments are powerfully affected by the conditions under which
students live, and thus these conditions are the contributing causes of
campus unrest. The Commission identified five such causes: (1) the
pressing problems of American society, particularly the war in South-
east Asia and the conditions of minority groups; (2) the changing status
and attitudes of youth in America; (3) the distinctive character of the
American university during the post-war period; (4) an escalating spiral
of reaction to student protest from public opinion and an escalating
spiral of violence; and (5) broad evolutionary changes occurring in the
culture and structure of modern Western society.
Other versions of student motives touch one or another of these
themes. Robert Powell, a student leader, sees the issues of racism, pov-
erty and war at the root of student unrest.10 He believes that the liberal
8 Paul Woodring, in a review of a new book, "Should Students Share the Power?"
by Earl McGrath, summarizes McGrath's reporting of the results of a poll instituted
by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1969. "The responses from 875
colleges and universities indicate that while most of them have not yet moved very
far; the trend is clearly in the direction of a larger voice for students. Of the insti-
tutions responding, 88.3% have admitted students to membership on at least one
policy-making body. Only 20% admit them to board meetings, and only 2.7% of the
boards give them a vote; but, in the kinds of policy-making for which the faculty
usually is responsible, the student role is substantially greater. About one institution
in four now has students on its executive committees, and nearly half (most of them
small liberal arts colleges) include students as voting members on curriculum com-
mittees. However, only 3.3% gives students voting membership on the committees
that govern faculty selection, promotion, and tenure." See Woodring, Student Power,
53 Saturday Rev. at 74 (Nov. 21, 1970).
9 Scranton Commission, supra n. 1 at 27, 28.
10 Powell, Student Power and the Student Role in Institutional Governance, 55 Lib-
eral Education at 24 (1969).
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administrator or faculty member on the campus has misused the tech-
nique of persuasion through dialogue and, therefore, only a student
share in decision-making power will again set the university on the right
track. Nevitt Sanford believes that authoritarianism, generated in child-
hood and perpetuated in schools and colleges by teachers who demand
obedience and respect, not because they deserve it, but merely because
of the positions they occupy, is the root cause of student unrest in the
university." J. Otis Cochran, a black law student, told the 1969 AALS
Convention that blacks and students alike could not believe in institu-
tions which were unresponsive to their needs by categorically denying
significant participation in the decisions of those institutions.' 2
The common theme running through these comments is the revolu-
tion in values which has occurred in the minds of many young people,
coupled with a high degree of self-confidence in their ability to put these
values into practice if only given a chance. We might call it a "new
moralism," and like all moralisms it easily becomes the inspiration for a
crusade.13 This crusade may well prove irresistible.
Theories of Student Participation
We shall discuss three basic models for student participation in law
school governance: the democratic model, the aristocratic model, and the
community or shared authority model.
The democratic model requires that certain features inherent in a
democracy be identified in the law school. Prof. Morris singles out two
conditions essential for a democracy to function as an appropriate and
effective form of government:
(1) a definite community of some kind so that one can clearly iden-
tify who is and who is not a member of that community having a
right to participate in it, and (2) a complete equality of all members,
each of whom has an equal voice in community affairs because of his
equality of status.14
To these we might add a third condition: the purpose of the democracy
is the well-being of all members of the democratic society. Lewy and
Rothman explain the basis for this equality:
. . . For purposes of casting their votes, all citizens, despite their
manifest inequalities in possessions or intellectual endowment, are
equal. The theoretical assumption is that such a democratically
elected and politically accountable government will best advance
the interests and well-being of all members of society. In Aristotle's
11 Sanford, The Campus Crisis in Authority, 51 Educational Record at 112 (1968).
12 Cochran, supra n. 6 at 63.
13 Bloustein, The New Student and His Role in American Colleges, 54 Liberal Edu-
cation 345 (1968).
14 Morris, supra n. 4 at 138.
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classical formulation, the cook is the person best able to prepare the
meal but the guests are the best judges of the quality of the feast.
Or again, the wearer of the shoe, not the shoemaker, is the person
who must decide whether the shoe pinches.15
Can the democratic model described above be applied to the univer-
sity? It seems not. The purpose of the university is specialized and its
primary mission is the advancement and dissemination of knowledge
for the benefit of its students as well as the community at large. This
purpose requires skill, knowledge and experience in those who impart
knowledge, and therefore, two distinct roles are readily discernible in
those who are members of the university. In vastly oversimplified terms,
the faculty teaches and the students learn. These distinctive roles are not
artificially imposed by some arbitrary policy within the society but flow
from the very nature of the university's mission. This differentiation of
role produces an inherent inequality between faculty and students in
achieving the university's purpose. This is not to say that the faculty
alone can fulfill this purpose, for students teach the faculty and one
another, and faculty learn from students and one another as well. The
point is rather that the primary role of each participant in the university
society is inherently different and therefore productive of a fundamental
inequality.
Morris advances other reasons for rejecting the democratic model
less convincing than those given above. 16 The democratic principle of
one-man, one-vote leads to the outnumbering of faculty by students and
therefore to student control of the law school. He also points to the fact
that the law school is not one community but many communities-fac-
ulty, graduate students, foreign students, students in first, second and
third year classes, students in special programs, law review, legal aid
societies, living groups-as reasons for rejecting the democratic principle.
Each of these communities ought to have the power to decide its own
affairs, and the various decisions ought to be reached democratically
within each community. But together they do not make up a common
community and therefore the democratic process is inappropriate in the
amalgam of these communities-the law school.
These arguments are unacceptable. It is true that the one-man, one-
vote principle would lead logically to student control of the law school,
but no serious advocate of student participation has applied democratic
theory with such literalness. After constructing and then demolishing
this straw man, Professor Morris turns logic on its head by concluding
that only a consultative and not a voting role is appropriate for students.
This proves too much, for it fails to explore the possibility of other vot-
ing formulas which would give students a share of power. Finally, in
15 Lewy and Rothman, On Student Power, 56 AAUP Bulletin at 279, 280 (1970).
16 Morris, supra n. 4 at 139.
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his second argument, Morris never defines the term "community" and
therefore he can prove almost anything he wants by selecting examples
of communities which only he can define. The point is not that the law
school is not a community, but rather that it is a type of community
which, because of its purpose, cannot be governed by literal application
of the democratic model to it.
Another rationale similar to the democratic model is the idea that
students ought to make those decisions that affect them, or a derivative
formulation, that students should be given the widest possible latitude to
regulate their own affairs. 17 These views prove more rhetorical than
helpful. They assume that one can easily identify subject areas of con-
cern and assign them readily to respective jurisdictions within a school
or university. Thus, it is argued, students should decide matters pertain-
ing to student discipline, dormitories, and activities. What is forgotten is
that the content of courses, degree requirements, grades, selection of fac-
ulty and salary scales of faculty, to name only a few, affect the students
directly and are of more importance to their lives in an academic com-
munity than sponsoring a film festival or organizing a rock concert.
Morris misses the point in his refutation of this rationale. He argues
that law school faculty, even though affected by decisions in other parts
of the university to hire or give tenure to colleagues, appropriately
should not have a vote in these decisions "because the decisions to hire
or give tenure are rightly made by persons who are especially com-
petent, by academic peers who through long study and experience are
especially qualified in the discipline." Is He ignores the fact that such
personnel decisions may well be subject to approval by other university-
wide committees or a Board of Trustees which may well include as
members persons who would not be considered academic peers of the
faculty member under consideration. Instead of conceding that distinct
and separate areas of jurisdiction exist, he would be on safer ground to
take the opposite tack proposed above and reject the "effect" rationale
on the grounds that, since we are all affected by virtually everything
that happens in a university, some other rationale for involvement in
governance must be formulated.
The second model for student participation in governance is the
aristocratic model. This model accepts many of the points made in
opposition to the democratic model discussed above. Building on distri-
bution of roles between faculty and students in the university commu-
nity, it emphasizes the inherent inequality of the two roles. Morris, for
example, has no doubt that "it is properly for the faculty and only for
17 Foote, Mayer and Associates, The Culture of the University: Governance and
Education, supra n. 7 at 79.
18 Morris, supra n. 4 at 139.
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the faculty . . . to make decisions in academic affairs." 19 Two reasons
support this conclusion: (1) the faculty uniquely has the greater com-
petence on academic questions; (2) the faculty has by state or university
law certain institutional responsibilities which are incurred solely be-
cause of their status as faculty members and which cannot be shared
or discharged.
Donald Cavers takes essentially the same position: "With respect
to most questions, I do not think student participation, or observations
of, meetings of the faculty or its committees would help the faculty in
the discharge of its responsibilities." 20 Other participants in this survey
voice similar opinions.2 1 Kelso would give students no controlling voice
in management because of their short time in attendance at school. Pol-
lak would not make students a part of a decision-making process since
they have no responsibility for decision-making. Miller argues in the
same vein that law schools are arms of the legal profession, of which
students are not yet members.
But many of those subscribing to the aristocratic model are quick to
make it a benevolent aristocracy by adding suggestions of greater or
lesser intensity that students should be consulted and open communica-
tions between students and faculty be maintained. Few are as narrow
as Mentschikoff, who maintains that student participation of any kind
should be discouraged except for indications and suggestions as to areas
of interest for course and seminar work.22 Many take the position of
Morris who opts for the principle of "consultation and accommodation"
as a proper and sure guide when resolving problems attendant to admit-
ting students to law school decision-making. 23 Thus students should be
heard in academic areas such as curriculum, effective teaching, examina-
tions and grading but faculty control must not be abandoned. He pro-
poses detailed structures for admitting students to non-voting member-
ship on certain committees and for holding open meetings with students.
The idea is to "get together," "to hear things out," to "bridge the com-
munications gap."
D. Bruce Johnstone finds three major weaknesses in this model.24
First, it is predicated upon a peculiarly American refusal to accept the
existence of a permanent, fundamental disagreement among reasonable
men. Conflict is viewed as essentially soluble if only the parties could
get together, open their minds and act with reason, whereas in fact the
conflict may be fundamental and insoluble. A second weakness is that
19 Id. at 140.
20 Cavers, supra n. 5.
21 Id.
22 Mentschikoff, supra n. 5 at 190.
23 Morris, supra n. 4 at 143.
24 Johnstone, The Student and His Power, 40 J. of Higher Ed. at 205, 208 (1969).
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this consultative role may fail to convey to any but a handful of student
leaders and political activists a true sense of participation and influence.
The great acquiescent middle of the student body (the silent majority)
is rarely heard. The third and most fundamental weakness is its am-
bivalence on matters of rights and authority. It is grounded on the
noblesse of the faculty and administration and thus it is quickly exposed
for what it is, symbolic power. Hendricks compares it to the earlier
stages of the civil rights movement, when the nation accepted the move-
ment as a means of altering the "system." 25 Later, however, when
blacks began to probe beneath the surface of white vested interests, the
system could not, or would not, relinquish power in response to per-
suasion. The language of black protest then changed from persuasion to
force, and distrust of any accommodation with established interests de-
veloped among black leaders. This might well be the outcome of the
aristocratic model.
A derivative form of the aristocratic model, as Johnstone describes
it,26 vests students "through some duly elected representative body with
a quasi-legal veto power or even complete jurisdiction over certain
matters-subject, of course, to the ultimate discretion of a governing
body or a state legislature." At the law school level they may be elected
in small numbers to certain committees as voting members, usually
excepting faculty appointments and promotions committees. But, as
Johnstone notes 2 7 the very nature of higher education precludes nearly
all matters of academic policy from student authority. This exclusion
has reasonable bases both in our traditional conception of the edu-
cational process and in the very nature of formal institutions. The first
basis assumes that a student has not yet attained the cognitive, attitudi-
nal or vocational goals for which education exists and therefore is not in
a position to know the knowledge that is of most worth or the means
by which this knowledge is to be gained. Thus the ultimate authority
over what and how he is to learn must reside with those who are older
and wiser. The second basis argues that the power to alter severely
either the goals or procedures of an educational institution cannot be
placed in the hands of students who would be immune from the con-
sequences of that exercise of power and who might jeopardize the
education of future students.
One solution to this dilemma has been to grant students virtual
sovereignty within narrowly prescribed domains, which poses no threat
either to the institution as a corporate person or to the members (as
opposed to the clients) of the institution. Thus Morris sees no problem
25 Hendricks, From Behind the Ivy Walls, as cited by The Future Academic Com-
munity at 141 (1969).
20 Johnstone, supra n. 24 at 209.
27 Id.
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in granting students decision-making power over matters concerning
the students' own private life, such as dress and length of hair and
parietal regulations.28 Nor does he object to application of the one-man,
one-vote principle equally to students and faculty alike in matters of a
non-academic nature affecting the entire law school community, such as
parking. The usual vehicle for implementing student governance over
such matters is a student government or student senate.
Often, however, student government becomes a "sandbox" activity
of students playing with trivial matters.29 The planning of social func-
tions or inviting speakers to the campus or chartering student organiza-
tions is not that type of student participation which students 'consider
meaningful. Its effect is to exclude the student from the most basic
sources of dissatisfaction: the content of the curriculum and the quality
of the teaching. The result is to reinforce student powerlessness in
academic matters which "may engender a tragic cynicism toward student
government and even the democratic process." 30
Moreover, the award of one or two voting seats on an academic
committee is not necessarily a solution. One may ask whether it consti-
tutes meaningful student power or mere tokenism, and one may fear
that it may polarize the students and faculty or administration into
hostile camps.
The third model is the community or shared authority model. The
university is viewed as a fellowship of autonomous human beings in
which the members are taught how to seek truth.3 ' It rests on the as-
sumption that its members are able to define and gradually to accept a
system of values for themselves. Learning is not an isolated classroom
experience but a sustained, continuous, public experience. The goal of a
university is "the creation of a community in which students educate
themselves and attain intellectual autonomy." 32
If the university environment values the student as an individual,
Foote and Mayer argue, then it demonstrates this respect by soliciting
his participation in significant policy-making for the community. They
believe that students should share the responsibility for developing
innovations in the curriculum, for evaluating the success of the entire
program, and for devising the indices most appropriate for measuring
and assessing a student's individual growth.
John Long, a student, described this same ideal to the AALS
delegates:
28 Morris, supra n. 4 at 142.
29 Hodgkinson, Students and as Intellectual Community, 49 Educational Record at
398, 403 (1968).
30 Johnstone, supra n. 24 at 211.
3' Foote, Mayer, and Associates, supra n. 7 at 80-81; The Draft Statement on Stu-
dent Participation of the AAUP, seems to rest on this model, supra n. 2.
32 Id. at 84.
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Students and teachers alike ... are all in that building for the same
reason, we are all attending those classes for the same reason, and
... we are trying to prepare ourselves to do something to make the
world a little bit better, by preparing ourselves to be the best
attorneys.
33
He saw full interaction of faculty and students in facilty committees and
meetings and in the general governance of the law school as fostering
"a true legal community, a common effort toward learning and
knowledge." 34
The community model is a philosophy or perhaps an attitude of
mind rather than a program. Its two key concepts-the student as an
individual who counts and the educational process as essentially self-
motivating and self-executing-have a personalist, egalitarian quality
which reflects the movement in society at large toward equality of
opportunity and individuality amid mass conformity. Perhaps this is an
ideal which has been lost in the modern university and needs to be
restated and reformulated. But if the model be long on ideals, it is
terribly short on practice. It fails to recognize that factionalism and
power are major realities in contemporary higher education. Much
effort and experimentation will be necessary to translate the ideal into
a workable program which actually involves faculty and students in the
governance of educational institutions.
Each of these three models tends to be an overstatement or an ex-
aggeration. It singles out one or two characteristics of the university or
law school and constructs a theory of governance on those character-
istics. But in pursuing these isolated features to their logical conclusions,
it neglects other characteristics and the result is a distorted educational
society or, what is worse, a discontented school.
Perhaps the conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that
there is no single model or theoretical basis for student participation, and
therefore the problem is best approached on pragmatic, experimental
grounds.3 5 We shall attempt in the following pages to explore some of
the practical implications of these various approaches.
Scope and Structure of Student Participation
The literature on the topic of student participation is filled with
discussions about the distinction between academic and non-academic
policy.36 Examples such as course content on the one hand, and visiting
33 Long, supra n. 6 at 54.
34 Id. at 56.
35 Howard, Goodbye Mr. Chips: Student Participation in Law School Decision Mak-
ing, 56 Va. L. Rev. 895, 897, 903 (1970).
3B Cowen, Student Participation in Law School Administration, 13 J. Legal Ed. at
214 (1960) for an example of a highly traditional approach to the question based on
the academic-non-academic distinction.
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speaker programs on the other, are given to illustrate how various
aspects of governance can be categorized and then parceled out to the
respective jurisdictions of faculty or students.
This neat distinction oversimplifies the nature of many college ac-
tivities. It implies a judgment that many of these activities are trivial
or irrelevant to the primary educational mission of the school but are
tolerated as necessary adjuncts of student life and because students hap-
pen to be interested in them. Implicit is the judgment that such matters
have little or no educational value and therefore can be safely left to the
students. This view thus tends to confine the educational or academic
work of an institution to the classroom and thereby to overlook the edu-
cational impact which many out-of-classroom activities have on students.
Student organizations, law reviews, and visiting speaker programs, to
name the obvious examples, form an important, though admittedly sec-
ondary part of the total education provided by a law school. We believe,
therefore, that the distinction between academic and non-academic mat-
ters is, for the most part, worthless. We suggest instead that virtually
all law school-sponsored programs be considered as academic in nature
but with varying degrees of academic content.
If everything that happens in a law school is academic, then the
problem becomes one of outlining the scope and dimensions of joint
faculty and student involvement in all these activities. It is with this
principle in mind that we shall explore the implications of the three
models described above.
The democratic model, taken literally, leads to some form of pro-
portional representation on all committees and governing bodies in the
law school, but students would constitute the majority membership of
all such bodies. The aristocratic model, on the other hand, would con-
fine student participation to some mixture of token voting membership
on some committees, non-voting representation on others, and no mem-
bership on a few.
The community model would appear to offer the greatest potential
for providing meaningful participation for all. Its obvious implication is
that all areas of law school governance should be open to all members of
the law school community. Students would be admitted as equals to
curriculum and personnel committees and even to faculty meetings. But
this is not to say that they should be present as a majority or in equal
numbers with the faculty. There are varying degrees of expertise, inter-
est, continuity, and stake in the outcome which different members of this
"community" bring to these bodies. Experienced faculty, for example,
bring a far richer background to curriculum matters than do students,
and therefore faculty might well constitute a substantial majority of a
curriculum committee. But students can also contribute significantly to
this committee's deliberations as the consumers of the product delivered
May 1971
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in the classroom and as citizens and future attorneys concerned about
the values latent in the law school curriculum. Students might bring to
such a committee a sensitivity to societal problems, such as the poor or
the environment or the cities, instead of the more traditional law school
concerns about power and wealth in society.3 7
This line of thought demands a role for students in faculty personnel
committees with jurisdiction over appointment, promotion, and tenure.
Most institutions have drawn the line here, however, and have refused
to admit students to a membership role on this committee. Interests
strongly conflict here. On the one hand, students have a definite stake
in personnel decisions. They are the beneficiaries of the faculty mem-
ber's teaching efforts. They are perhaps the most qualified members of
the law school community to evaluate him in this respect because of
their regular exposure to him in the classroom, particularly when one
considers the traditional reluctance of faculty colleagues to audit another
colleague's classes. Schwartz states the case in this fashion:
Dull lectures, perfunctory examinations, papers graded without sub-
stantive comment, lack of classroom discussion, inaccessibility of
the professor, all these rank much higher on a list of student gripes
than complaints that an English professor chose to teach Hamlet
rather than King Lear in a Shakespeare course, or that a political
scientist was a behavioralist rather than a traditionalist. Student
Course and Teacher Evaluations are more critiques for teaching
than they are proposals for curricular revision. The medium out-
weighs the message. 38
But other factors must be considered. Students are usually not in a
position to judge a professor's scholarly or professional activities outside
the classroom. Moreover, the appointments process is highly sensitive.
Professor Dick Howard sees student involvement in it as raising prob-
lems of academic freedom, politicization of the appointment system and
material hindrances to recruitment of faculty.39 One might also ask
whether students will maintain the confidentiality of information about
the faculty.
Howard's solution to this dilemma is for a law school to find in-
formal rather than institutionalized means for obtaining student opinion
on teaching ability of faculty. The effectiveness of such an approach,
however, is open to question. Informal methods may provide insufficient,
or what is worse, misleading information about a professor, and errone-
ous judgments may result from reliance upon it. Such methods also
have less "visibility" in student eyes than more formal procedures and
37 Taylor, Wealth, Poverty and Social Change: A Suggestion for a Balanced Cur-
riculum, 22 J. Legal Ed. 227 (1969).
38 Schwartz, Student Power-In Response to the Questions, as cited in "The Future
Academic Community," at 62 (1969).
39 Howard, supra n. 35 at 914-5.
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may therefore be treated as gestures by the faculty and of no significant
consequence in the evaluative process.
The question of confidentiality is not easily answered. One may
argue that law students are as capable of keeping secrets as other adults,
and yet one may envisage enormous social pressures on elected student
representatives to justify their actions by disclosure of confidential
information.
Some experimentation with a formal role for students, such as com-
mittee membership, appears to be desirable.
As for activities or committees with a strong student orientation,
the same principles indicate that faculty should participate but to a
lesser extent than students. The mix of need for continuity of policy,
stake in the outcome and expertise is different and therefore a different
ratio of faculty-student collaboration is called for. But, as long as these
activities can be called educational at all, we believe faculty ought to be
involved in them to some extent.
What has been said regarding the role of students in committees
extends equally to student participation in general faculty meetings. The
community concept of the law school appears to require a significant
student part in the general meeting. The irony is that, in some univer-
sities, students are voting members of the university senate but are not
permitted even to attend the law school's faculty meeting. Many schools
have side-stepped the issue by establishing a student senate with juris-
diction over "student affairs." The illusion is hopefully created that the
student senate has parallel jurisdiction with the faculty assembly and
thus a bicameral system has been produced. The reality, however, is
only another form of the aristocratic model described above and is
subject to the same criticisms. It certainly does not deceive the students.
Howard describes some of the arrangements which law schools are
now trying:
A common system is to allow students who are members of a joint
faculty-student committee to attend faculty meetings to participate
in, but not vote in, discussions of reports or recommendations com-
ing out of the committee on which they sit. Another approach is to
allow certain students, ex officio or selected on some other basis, to
attend meetings regularly, but again without vote. Whatever the
arrangement, one invariable qualification is the reservation by the
law faculty of the right to call executive sessions. 40
Howard's chief concern about admitting students to faculty meetings is
the broad range of topics treated at such meetings and the need for
candid and confidential discussion of them. He contrasts the law school
meeting, where personnel matters are discussed, with meetings of under-
graduate faculties which typically treat of curriculum and academic
40 Id. at 918.
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standards and leave personnel matters to departments and deans, where
presumably students are kept out. One may question Howard's impres-
sions of the undergraduate faculty's decision-making process and the
student's role in it. One might also ask why students should be excluded
from anything but a consultative role over all matters at law school
faculty meetings if only personnel matters are the real concern. This
position says, in effect, that students may share in the formulation of
recommendations at the committee level in certain areas, but they can-
not play a significant part in the decision-making process, the vote at a
faculty meeting.
We have tried to avoid fixing numbers or ratios for membership on
faculty and students on various bodies. The twin extremes of token
representation at the one end or a representation exceeding potential
contribution to the body's work at the other end are to be avoided. Nor
do we advocate equal representation of faculty and students as the
proper solution. Howard's reminders to "keep it simple" and avoid a
preoccupation with governance are well taken.4 1 Each institution will
have to work out its own formula in the light of its own traditions, re-
sources, interests and responsibilities.
Some Practical Problems
There are many practical problems associated with implementing
these principles.
The initial problem is representation. Two operative principles
might be considered in devising a program in this area: (1) as many
different students as possible ought to be involved in the decision-making
process; (2) their constituency, the student body, ought to sense that it
has the power to choose its representatives. Thus Howard argues that
students themselves ought to determine the method of selection.42 He
would not permit a direct, popular election, however, since this method
tends to politicize the selection process and thereby detract from the
objectives of a law school.
This raises the question of the "representativeness" of the repre-
sentatives. Lewy and Rothman believe that students with special emo-
tional needs or a particular axe to grind come to control student govern-
ment.43 Dolan, on the other hand, believes this is a non-issue, or at least
an irrelevant one.44 For him it smacks of political talk about the "silent
majority," although he is not clear which of the several possible infer-
ences he is drawing from this remark. In any event, he argues that "the
41 Id. at 910-11.
42 Id. at 917-18.
43 Lewy and Rothman, supra n. 15 at 281.
44 Dolan, supra n. 6 at 78-79.
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vanguard of social change hardly ever comes about through the majority
of representative people."
But the question of "representativeness" should not be rejected so
lightly. Perhaps the answer is to challenge the assumptions of those who
raise it by a student referendum on the issue of student participation in
governance. An affirmative vote would certainly strengthen the case for
an important student role at the particular institution, while a negative
vote might well call for only consultation as the appropriate part for
students there.
A related question is that of student apathy. To a certain extent
this issue may be a "chicken or egg" problem. Foote and Mayer thus de-
scribe the dilemma: "[student] participation is a necessary spark for
educational reinvigoration, but meaningful participation can hardly take
place without such reinvigoration." 41 Lewy and Rothman note that,
in most universities, whether in the United States or abroad, only a
very limited segment of the student body votes regularly. In a re-
cent hotly contested election at the University of Texas less than
one third of the eligible students turned out to vote and the story
is the same elesewhere. 46
But the story is not always the same elsewhere. Approximately 70 per
cent of the students at Columbia Law School voted in the Fall, 1970,
election for a student senator.4 7 Different conclusions, however, may be
drawn from these facts. Lewy and Rothman s argue that the student ma-
jority's failure to participate where the opportunity is offered means that
there should be no student representation in governance, while Foote and
Mayer reason to the contrary that "the indifference of a majority should
(not) serve as an excuse for excluding from the decision-making process
the ideas and talents of those who are civic-minded enough to want to
offer them." 49
Bloc voting of student representatives is also raised as a problem. 0
This may be a phenomenon in the early phases of student participation
or on certain issues, but maturity in and experience with a role in
governance will diminish this tendency. This spectre of a student faction
also fails to realize that many issues do not break down very easily into
pro-student or pro-faculty sides and therefore blocs simply do not
emerge.
45 Foote, Mayer, and Associates, supra n. 7 at 92.
46 Lewy and Rothman, supra n. 15 at 281.
47 McPhillips, Equal Rights for Students, 25 Columbia Law School News, at 1, 8
(Dec. 2, 1970).
48 Lewy and Rothman, supra n. 15 at 281.
49 Foote, Mayer, and Associates, supra n. 7 at 92.
5D Dolan, supra n. 6 at 80.
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Dolan raises the question of student cowardice:
Will the students that sit on the committee having the advantages of
information not brought to the attention of the majority, and if they
they find out that their preconceived notion does not accord with
the facts, will students vote against what is perhaps a clamoring
popular issue in the law school if they are convinced of the merits,
or will they succumb to the majority prejudice on the particular
issue and their peer group status pressures? 51
He sees this as a problem not peculiar to students and one in which the
electorate, as in other contexts, will provide the counter pressure of
questioning and publicity.
Foote and Mayer's advice is appropriate here:
1. It will be very difficult to devise methods for getting those stu-
dents who are concerned onto appropriate committees.
2. Only long-term evaluation of the results of participatory experi-
ments will have much significance, for no matter what selection
methods are devised there will be repeated instances in which
student committees or the students placed in joint committee
roles will be uninterested, or awed into silence, or truant, or ig-
norantly bellicose. (Similarly, there will be instances in which
students will find their faculty counterparts uninterested, or
overawed into silence, or truant, or obdurantly complacent.)
3. The only course of action that holds out some hope of mitigating
these problems is to open up genuine channels for students, to
encourage development of student skills, and to persevere with
patience when the results do not measure up to expectations.
Self-government has never been justified on grounds of its su-
perior efficiency or because it is foolproof.5 2
Conclusion
Student participation in the governance of the law school, regardless
of its rationale or scope, is an idea whose day has arrived. Like most
new ideas with practical applications, its full dimensions will be per-
ceived only through experimentation and adaptation to the circum-
stances of each institution. What is probably needed most at this stage
in the development of the principle is to avoid the doctrinaire approach
which emphasizes quotas and structure but which may easily stifle the
natural growth of the concept. Both faculty and students will best help
it grow to maturity by doing it with as little self-consciousness as pos-
sible rather than merely talking about it.
51 Id.
52 Foote, Mayer, and Associates, supra n. 7 at 93-4.
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